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Summary: The constitutions of the old and new Member States offer a 
wide range of models in terms of their adjustment for EU membership, 
with a number of them containing minimal or even no references to the 
EU. This paper highlights the importance of adequate amendments 
in light of selected recent judgments by the highest courts in Poland, 
Estonia and Latvia, where judges have found themselves in the rather 
vexed situation of having to fi nd pragmatic solutions to ensure the 
constitutionality of legislation without jeopardising the supremacy of 
EC law. In this process, certain constitutional provisions that confl ict 
with EC/EU law appear to have been put on hold, prompting the ques-
tion of whether a move towards greater ‘constitutional amorphous-
ness’ has tacitly been accepted by virtue of EU accession.
1. Introduction: Minimalism of constitutional amendments in CEE 
Member States
In the process of EU entry, it is incumbent upon the accession coun-
tries to align their legislation to the requirements of the wide-ranging ac-
quis communautaire, under careful scrutiny by the EU. There is, however, 
one important legal instrument which appears to be virtually exempt from 
harmonisation: the national constitution. As a fundamental expression 
of state sovereignty, constitutions establish basic rules on the distribu-
tion of powers and decision-making within a state. States therefore hold 
the prerogative of determining whether and to what extent membership 
in the EU should be mentioned in their national constitutions. The latest 
enlargements, however, have offered some evidence of nascent inroads by 
the EU into national autonomy with regard to determining the content of 
constitutions. Examples include the European Commission’s demands 
for amendment of constitutional provisions on the judiciary in Slovakia, 
Romania and Bulgaria, and for adjustment of the rules on the national 
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currency in Estonia. However, core constitutional provisions on the or-
ganisation of powers and their transfer to the EU remain fi rmly within the 
remit of the Member States.
In the absence of unifi ed EU requirements, national constitutions 
represent an area of law which, intriguingly, appears to be rather poorly 
adapted to EU membership. Of the constitutions of the 15 ‘old’ Member 
States,1 four offer no mention of the EU - the constitutions of the Neth-
erlands, Luxembourg, Denmark and Spain. Indeed, Monica Claes has 
noted that, were an alien to land in these countries and read their con-
stitutions, he might well fail to notice their EU membership altogether.2 
Three other constitutions - those of Finland, Belgium and (since 2001) 
Italy - accommodate the transfer of powers under a broader clause on 
international organisations, but make explicit references to the EU in 
relation to a limited number of specifi c issues. The third group, which 
best commends itself as a model for accession countries, consists of con-
stitutions that contain explicit provisions on the delegation or transfer 
of powers to the European Union -those of France, Germany, Portugal, 
Ireland, Austria, Sweden and (after the 2001 reform) Greece. Besides the 
transfer clauses, most constitutions in this group contain further provi-
sions dealing with specifi c aspects of EU membership, such as control by 
the national parliament over the government in the EU decision-making 
process, active and passive voting rights of EU citizens in local council 
elections in another Member State and elections for the European Parlia-
ment, and issues related to the Monetary Union.3 
As regards the new Member States that joined the EU in 2004, the 
author has provided a detailed overview of the constitutional amend-
ments elsewhere, characterising them broadly as minimalist for the 
reasons which follow.4 Firstly, in the majority of Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries, the amendments have been addressed to in-
ternational organisations generally, rather than to the European Union 
explicitly. For instance, the new Article 10a of the Constitution of the 
Czech Republic provides that ‘[s]ome powers […] may be transferred to 
an international organisation or institution’. Poland’s 1997 Constitution 
provides that Poland may ‘delegate to an international organisation or in-
ternational institution the competence of organs of state authority in re-
1  For a comparative overview, see M Claes, ‘Constitutionalizing Europe at its Source: The 
“European Clauses” in the National Constitutions: Evolution and Typology’ (2005) 24 YB 
Eur L 81-125. For accounts of individual countries, see the contributions published in AE 
Kellermann, J De Zwaan and J Czuczai (eds) EU Enlargement: The Constitutional Impact at 
EU and National Level (Asser Press, The Hague 2001).
2  Claes (n 1) 107.
3  For details, see eg Claes (n 1) 81ff and A Albi, EU Enlargement and the Constitutions of 
Central and Eastern Europe (CUP, Cambridge 2005) ch 2.
4  For details, see Albi, EU Enlargement (n 3) ch 5.
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lation to certain matters’ (Art 90(1)). The same approach has been taken 
in Latvia and Slovenia, although in Latvia a referendum for entry into the 
European Union was also specifi cally envisaged. Lithuania joined the EU 
under its existing provisions on international organisations (Art 136); a 
free-standing Constitutional Act on Lithuania’s membership in the Eu-
ropean Union was additionally adopted shortly after accession in July 
2004, authorising the delegation of state competences to the EU. Only in 
Slovakia (Art 7(2)) and Hungary (Art 2A) did the provisions of constitu-
tional amendments expressly address the European Union.
The second aspect of minimalism concerns the range of issues which 
led to the amendments. While a relatively extensive range of amendments 
were introduced in Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Hungary, 
in the remaining four CEE countries manifest confl icts with EU law in 
their constitutions were left unresolved, contrary to the advice of legal ex-
perts. In Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, however, the amendment process 
was to some extent resumed after accession, in the less politically charged 
post-referendum climate. Besides the delegation of powers, the following 
main issues have now been addressed in the constitutions of CEE Member 
States, together with their later amendments:5 the direct effect of the law 
of the EC6 or an ‘international organisation’;7 removal of the bans on buy-
ing real estate8 and on extradition;9 parliamentary control over government 
in EU affairs;10 the participation of EU citizens in local11 and European 
Parliament elections;12 facilitating the implementation of EU obligations;13 
and the role of the national central bank.14 It should be noted that amend-
5  For details, see Albi, EU Enlargement (n 3) ch 5; tables with the text of the amendments 
are available on p 238ff.
6  Art 7(2) of the Slovak Constitution. A provision on the application of EU law was also 
introduced into Lithuania’s Constitutional Act on EU Membership in July 2004.
7  Art 3a(3) of the Slovenian Constitution; Art 10 of the Czech Constitution; Art 91 of the 
Polish Constitution.
8  Art 68 of the Slovenian Constitution; Art 47 of the Lithuanian Constitution (as regards 
the purchase of agricultural land).
9  Art 47 of the Slovenian Constitution. In Latvia, such an amendment was introduced after 
accession in 2004; in Poland, an amendment was introduced in 2006, following the Euro-
pean Arrest Warrant case discussed in section 2.2 of this paper.
10  Art 3a(4) of the Slovenian Constitution; Art 10b of the Czech Constitution; Art 35A of 
the Hungarian Constitution. A provision on parliamentary control was also introduced into 
Lithuania’s Constitutional Act on EU Membership in July 2004.
11  Art 119 of the Lithuanian Constitution; Art 30(1) of the Slovak Constitution; Art 70(2) of 
the Hungarian Constitution. In Latvia, such an amendment was introduced after accession 
in 2004.
12  Art 70(4) of the Hungarian Constitution.
13  Art 120(2) of the Slovak Constitution; this provision also permits the imposition of duties 
upon citizens by government decree. A provision on the implementation of EU obligations 
was also introduced into Lithuania’s Constitutional Act on EU Membership in July 2004.
14  Art 32D(1) of the Hungarian Constitution.
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ments in Romania and Bulgaria, the 2007 accession countries, appear to 
run counter to this minimalist trend. In October 2003 Romania adopted a 
remarkably comprehensive package of amendments addressed specifi cally 
to the EU. Central to this is the new Title V1 on ‘Euro-Atlantic Integration’ 
(Art 1451), which allows the transfer of ‘certain powers’ to Community in-
stitutions, provides for the application and precedence of EC law, and en-
visages parliament’s control over the government in EU affairs. Elsewhere 
in the Romanian Constitution there are amendments concerning issues 
such as EU citizens’ voting rights in local elections, the election of Euro-
pean Parliament members, the extradition of Romanian citizens, the right 
of non-nationals to acquire land, and the possibility of adopting the com-
mon currency. Bulgaria’s constitutional amendments permit the country 
to ‘participate in the establishment and development of the European Un-
ion’, and additionally address issues such as the land ownership regime, 
the ban on the extradition of citizens, and the active and passive voting 
rights of EU citizens in local and European Parliament elections.
The third aspect, procedural minimalism, is specifi c to the Baltic 
countries. Here the amendment process proved rather diffi cult and con-
troversial, because rigid constitutional amendment procedures required 
a referendum to amend the constitutional articles on sovereignty and 
independence. This requirement proved too challenging to comply with in 
the process of EU accession, against a background of public support for 
EU membership that was consistently the lowest among the candidate 
countries, while the issue of delegation of sovereignty sparked controver-
sy due to these countries’ recently regained independence. Estonia and 
Lithuania adopted free-standing constitutional acts rather than amend-
ments to the texts of their constitutions, Lithuania doing so only after 
accession. Latvia created a special referendum for EU accession, with a 
reduced turnout requirement.
Overall, the amendments in Central and Eastern Europe may thus 
broadly be described as minimal, albeit in different respects in different 
countries, and with some improvements later in the post-accession peri-
od. As accession referendums were imminent at the time, it was probably 
essential to keep a low profi le concerning constitutional revision, as a 
wider range of amendments could have fuelled the eurosceptics’ outcries 
about loss of sovereignty. Additional reasons for minimal amendments 
included the sheer diffi culty of amendment procedures in some countries 
and the prevalence of traditional theoretical views on sovereignty, which 
fed into the ‘international organisation’ approach.15
15  See Albi, EU Enlargement (n 3) 409ff. The prevalence of a traditional approach to sover-
eignty in the CEE countries has also been noted by A Sajó, ‘Accession’s Impact on Consti-
tutionalism in the New Member States’ in GA Bermann and K Pistor (eds), Law and Govern-
ance in an Enlarged European Union (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2004) 417.
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While shortcomings in the adjustment of constitutions are, as seen 
above, a matter of national discretion, and will not trigger any sanctions 
from the EU, they do have at least two important ramifi cations for Mem-
ber States’ internal legal systems, which will be the main focus of this 
paper. Firstly, courts, and in particular constitutional courts, may fi nd 
themselves in the rather vexed situation of having to fi nd pragmatic solu-
tions to ensure the constitutionality of legislation without jeopardising the 
supremacy of EC law. To this end, the paper will consider the Polish Con-
stitutional Tribunal’s European Arrest Warrant (EAW) decision,16 where 
national provisions implementing the European Arrest Warrant Frame-
work Decision17 were annulled on the ground of their incompatibility with 
Article 55 of the Polish Constitution. This provision, which expressly pro-
hibits the extradition of Polish nationals, had not been amended prior to 
EU accession, despite numerous calls to that effect. The Tribunal dis-
played considerable resourcefulness in granting the Polish Parliament 
an 18-month period during which extradition could continue while the 
Constitution was amended. In another decision to be considered here, 
the Tribunal was presented with 14 alleged confl icts between the Consti-
tution and the Polish Accession Treaty.18 It will be seen that the Tribunal 
rejected all of these, at the same time making a strong statement about 
supremacy which has been perceived as representative of ‘unconditional 
national constitutional sovereignty’.19 As Sadurski astutely notes, such 
a move, which displayed a striking contrast between its ‘Euro-friendly’ 
outcome and ‘Europe-unfriendly’ tone, was aimed at simultaneously re-
assuring several audiences, by placating political forces concerned about 
the surrender of sovereignty, on the one hand, while on the other en-
suring compatibility with obligations arising from EU membership.20 The 
paper will also consider judgments by the highest courts in Estonia and 
Latvia, where the courts had to gloss over certain questionable practices 
in the constitutional amendment procedure, due to the lack of any room 
to manoeuvre. 
16  Wyrok z dnia 27 kwietnia 2005 r. Sygn. akt. P 1/05 [Judgment of 27 April 2005 in Case 
P 1/05]. A summary of the judgment is available in English on the Constitutional Tribunal’s 
website: <www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/documents/P_1_05_GB.pdf> accessed 1 
August 2007. 
17  Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest 
warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States [2002] OJ L190/1.
18  Wyrok z dnia 11 maja 2005 r. Sygn. akt. K 18/04 [Judgment of 11 May 2005 in Case K 
18/04]. A summary of the judgment is available in English on the Constitutional Tribunal’s 
website: <www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/documents/K_18_04_GB.pdf> accessed 1 
August 2007.
19  D Chalmers et al, European Union Law (CUP, Cambridge 2006) 198 and 201.
20  W Sadurski, ‘“Solange, Chapter 3”: Constitutional Courts in Central Europe’ (2006) EUI 
Law Working Paper 40 pp 22-23.
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Examination of these cases will lead us to the second and more fun-
damental point, namely, whether a move towards greater ‘constitutional 
amorphousness’ has been tacitly accepted by virtue of EU accession. 
With constitutional courts glossing over clashes with EC/EU law in their 
quest to fi nd pragmatic, EU-friendly solutions, it appears that the CEE 
Member States’ constitutions, which have hitherto provided a robust ba-
sis for vigorous constitutional review frequently leading to annulments of 
incompatible national acts, may have partly been reduced to paper tigers, 
with provisions confl icting with EU law put on hold. 
2. Constitutionality challenges in Poland
2.1. The Accession Treaty case: EU-friendly interpretation
By way of background to the case studies that follow, it should be 
mentioned that Poland adopted a new constitution in 1997, with Arti-
cle 90(1) allowing the country to delegate certain competences to inter-
national organisations, and Article 91 establishing the direct effect and 
supremacy of ratifi ed international agreements and EC secondary law.21 
However, there were calls to amend the Polish Constitution prior to EU 
accession, so as to remove certain confl icts with regard to EC/EU law 
which might nonetheless arise.22 The problematic provisions included Ar-
ticle 62(1), under which voting rights in local elections are the preserve of 
Polish citizens; Article 227(1), which grants the National Bank of Poland 
the exclusive right to issue Polish currency; and Articles 52(4) and 55, 
which prohibit the extradition of Polish citizens. However, amending the 
Constitution would have posed the risk of strengthening nationalist anti-
EU movements ahead of the accession referendum which was then im-
minent, with public support for accession already at a borderline 50 per-
cent. Furthermore, it would have been diffi cult to secure the necessary 
political support, as constitutional amendments required the approval 
of two parliamentary chambers, and involved the possibility of holding a 
referendum.23
21  For more detail, see eg S Biernat, ‘Constitutional Aspects of Poland’s Future Membership 
in the European Union’, (1998) 36 Archiv des Völkerrechts 398; J Barcz, ‘Membership of 
Poland in the European Union in the Light of the Constitution of 2 April 1997’ (1997-98) 23 
Polish Yearbook of International Law 21; A Łazowski, ‘Poland’ in A Ott and K Inglis (eds), 
Handbook on European Enlargement. A Commentary on the Enlargement Process (TMC Asser 
Press, The Hague 2002) 299.
22  See K Wojtowicz, ‘Proposed Changes in the Polish Constitution of 1997 Ahead of Poland’s 
Accession to the European Union’ (2001) 25 Polish Yearbook of International Law 40-44 
and S Biernat, ‘The Openness of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland Towards Euro-
pean Integration’ in G Amato, G Braibant and E Venizelos (eds), The Constitutional Revision 
in Today’s Europe (Esperia Publications, London 2002) 439, 445ff.
23  For more detail, see Biernat (n 22) 446ff.
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It did not take long for the Constitutional Tribunal to be seized with 
regard to confl icts between these provisions and EC law. To begin with, 
in a case decided on 31 May 2004 a group of members of the Sejm (the 
lower house of the Polish Parliament) argued that the 2004 Act on Elec-
tions to the European Parliament was unconstitutional, since the par-
ticipation of foreign nationals was in confl ict with the principle of the 
sovereignty of the Polish people (Art 4(1) of the Constitution), as well as 
with clauses granting the right to vote to Polish citizens only. According 
to Article 19 EC Treaty, every citizen of the Union residing in a Member 
State of which he is not a national shall have the right to vote and stand 
as a candidate in municipal elections and elections to the European Par-
liament. In rejecting their claim,24 the Constitutional Tribunal underlined 
the importance of the constitutional principle mandating an EU-friendly 
interpretation of national law. According to the Tribunal, ‘[when] inter-
preting legislation in force, account should be taken of the constitutional 
principle of favourable predisposition towards the process of European 
integration and the cooperation between States’.25 According to the Tri-
bunal, the Polish Constitution is the supreme act establishing the legal 
basis for the existence of the Polish State; however, it does not apply to 
structures other than the Polish State.26 Under Articles 90(1) and (3) of 
the Constitution, in combination with the Accession Treaty, certain pow-
ers were delegated to the EU level; reviewing the acts of EU bodies is a 
matter for EU law, and Polish implementing provisions and the Constitu-
tion may not be deployed in order to review the constitutionality of politi-
cal decision-making at the EU level.
A similar pragmatic approach followed in the Accession Treaty case.27 
The claimants, who came from among three political groups in the Sejm 
that were opposed to Poland’s EU membership, argued that a number of 
provisions in the Accession Treaty and EC/EU Treaties were in confl ict 
with the Polish Constitution, particularly with the constitutional prin-
ciples of the sovereignty of the Polish people and the supremacy of the 
Constitution within Poland’s legal system. The fourteen alleged confl icts 
arose, inter alia, from the right of EU citizens to vote and stand in both 
European Parliament and municipal elections, the adoption of the com-
mon currency, and changes affecting the separation of powers.
It is telling that the Tribunal dismissed all fourteen of these claims. 
As regards municipal elections, the Tribunal held that the aforementioned 
24  Judgment of 31 May 2004 in Case K 15/04. A summary of the judgment is available in 
English on the Constitutional Tribunal’s website: <www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/
K_15_04_GB.pdf> accessed 1 August 2007.
25  English summary of Judgment in Case K 15/04 (n 24) para 10.
26  English summary of Judgment in Case K 15/04 (n 24) para 1.
27  Judgment in Case K 18/04 (n 18).
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Article 4 (on the sovereignty of the Polish people) does not encompass local 
elections, and that Article 62(1), which guarantees to Polish citizens the 
right to elect, inter alia, representatives to local self-government bodies, 
does not preclude the possibility of also according this right to citizens of 
other states. The Tribunal equally rejected the applicants’ claim that the 
powers of the European Central Bank are in confl ict with Article 227(1) 
of the Polish Constitution, which establishes the National Bank of Poland 
as the central bank of the state and vests in it the exclusive right to is-
sue money and to formulate and implement monetary policy. This claim 
was rejected because Article 105 of the EC Treaty, which deals with these 
matters, is not of a self-executing nature. Importantly for the purposes 
of this paper, the Tribunal stated that when Poland adopts the common 
currency in the future, a decision may well be required to amend the 
Polish Constitution in this respect. Another interesting point was that the 
claimants also raised the issue of the constitutionality of potential future 
introduction of same-sex marriages, an issue that has generated much 
controversy in this strongly Catholic country. According to Article 18 of 
the Polish Constitution, marriage is a union between a man and woman. 
The Tribunal dismissed this claim by noting that the current wording of 
Article 13 EC does not pertain to the institution of marriage as such; any 
future change in this respect would, however, require amendment of the 
Polish Constitution.
The Tribunal also made a strong statement about the supremacy of 
the Polish Constitution, which has become the best-known part of this 
judgment. However, it is important to underline the fact that all of the 
claims above were rejected, as this demonstrates the Tribunal’s endeav-
our to interpret national provisions in an EU-friendly way, even though 
at times its interpretation may appear rather far-fetched to an outside 
observer. The part of the decision concerning supremacy was closely con-
ditioned by the Tribunal’s decision in the European Arrest Warrant case, 
which was made two weeks before the Accession Treaty decision. In order 
to fully understand the Tribunal’s statements on supremacy, we will fi rst 
examine the EAW decision and then return to the supremacy aspect of 
the Accession Treaty decision.
2.2. The European Arrest Warrant decision: Limits to interpretation
The cases above having offered ample evidence of the Polish Tribu-
nal’s EU-friendly approach, the focus will now turn to the European Ar-
rest Warrant decision,28 where the Tribunal was confronted with a lack 
28  Judgment in Case P 1/05 (n 16). See A Łazowski, ‘Constitutional Tribunal on the Sur-
render of Polish Citizens Under the European Arrest Warrant. Decision of 27 April 2005’ 
(2005) 1 EuConst 569, 573ff and K Kowalik-Bańczyk, ‘Should We Polish It Up? The Polish 
47CYELP 3 [2007] 39-58
of manoeuvring space due to an unequivocal confl ict with the national 
constitution. The case concerned Article 55(1) of the Polish Constitution, 
which provides in explicit and unconditional manner that ‘[t]he extradi-
tion of a Polish citizen shall be forbidden’. The Polish legislature trans-
posed the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision by amending 
the 1997 Penal Procedure Code in 2004,29 without any accompanying 
amendment to the Constitution. Instead, a terminological distinction be-
tween ‘extradition’ and ‘surrender’ was employed, implying that the latter 
is not prohibited under Article 55(1) of the Constitution. However, the 
Regional Court of Gdańsk initiated proceedings before the Constitutional 
Tribunal to review whether the surrender of Polish citizen Maria D. to the 
Netherlands was compatible with Article 55(1) of the Constitution.30
The Tribunal held that, despite numerous procedural differences be-
tween extradition and surrender, the two procedures are very similar in 
substance.31 Thus, according to the judges, the surrender procedure is but 
a variation on extradition, and the prohibition enshrined in Article 55 of 
the Constitution is, therefore, fully applicable to both procedures. Further-
more, the Constitutional Tribunal argued that a pro-European interpreta-
tion of this provision is not possible, as the principles of supremacy and 
indirect effect do not apply to third-pillar legislation (the Pupino decision 
had yet to be delivered by the ECJ32), and in any event ECJ jurisprudence 
has placed limitations on the principle of indirect effect, especially as re-
gards aggravating criminal liability.33 As a consequence, the implement-
ing provision in the Penal Procedure Code was declared unconstitutional. 
However, the Tribunal did not bar extradition, instead granting Parliament 
an 18-month transitional period during which the Constitution was to be 
amended, and the surrender of Polish nationals could continue.
Although this case concerned the third pillar, where EU law does not 
enjoy supremacy, the Tribunal’s judgment is regarded as sitting some-
what uneasily with the Pupino judgment delivered shortly afterwards by 
the ECJ.34 According to Pupino, the obligation of loyal cooperation under 
Article 10 of the EC Treaty and the principle of indirect effect do also 
Constitutional Tribunal and the Idea of Supremacy of EU Law’, (2005) 6 German Law Jour-
nal 1355 <www.germanlawjournal.org> accessed 1 August 2007.
29  Ustawa z dnia 18 marca 2004 r. o zmianie ustawy - Kodeks karny, ustawy - Kodeks 
postępowania karnego oraz ustawy - Kodeks wykroczeń [Act Amending the Penal Code, 
the Criminal Procedure Code and the Minor Offences Code] [2004] Dziennik Ustaw 69 item 
626.
30  For information on the factual background, see Łazowski (n 28) 573ff.
31  See Łazowski (n 28) 574ff, especially 576-577.
32  See n 34 and accompanying text.
33  See eg Case 80/86 Kolpinghuis Nijmegen [1987] ECR I-3969.
34  Case C-105/03 Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285. For dis-
cussion, see Łazowski (n 28) 578ff.
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apply to the third pillar; the Polish EAW decision had excluded indirect 
effect from this domain. However, these judgments could nonetheless be 
regarded as compatible, given that Pupino places certain limits on indi-
rect effect, including the rule that indirect effect should not lead to contra 
legem interpretation. Indeed, given the Constitutional Tribunal’s inability 
to interpret the Polish Constitution in light of the Framework Decision 
without going contra legem, it appears to have been permissible to grant 
priority to the Polish Constitution. 
In any event, the 18-month transitional period it granted proves that 
the Tribunal essentially sought to ensure an EU-friendly, pragmatic ap-
proach,35 especially in light of its previous case law considered above. In-
deed, the Tribunal emphasised that the Polish legislature should ‘give the 
highest priority’ to ensuring the functioning of the EAW system.36 Moreo-
ver, the explicit prohibition of extradition in the Constitution clearly left 
the Tribunal with no room to manoeuvre. As seen above, other provisions 
allowed a certain measure of interpretation, and indeed were interpreted 
by the Tribunal as either compatible with EC law (eg provisions on voting 
rights) or requiring amendment in a more distant future (eg provisions 
on the Central Bank in the event of Poland’s adoption of the common 
currency). However, Article 55(1), which was formulated as a rule rather 
than a principle,37 left the Court’s hands rather tied.
The Polish decision can be further contextualised by comparing it 
with decisions by the constitutional courts of some other Member States, 
which have equally faced controversial issues and asserted their preroga-
tives with regard to the third pillar. Indeed, in November 2005 the Su-
preme Court of Cyprus annulled a national implementing law, based on 
reasoning that closely followed the Polish EAW decision.38 In Germany, 
the Constitutional Court declared a national law implementing the Euro-
pean Arrest Warrant unconstitutional in July 2005, on the ground that 
the margins afforded by the Framework Decision on the European Arrest 
Warrant had not been exhausted in such a way as to ensure the high-
est possible consideration for the protection of fundamental rights.39 Jan 
35  For a similar conclusion, see also Łazowski (n 28) 581; Kowalik-Bańczyk (n 28) 1360; J 
Komárek, ‘European Constitutionalism and the European Arrest Warrant: Contrapunctual 
Principles in Disharmony’ (2005) Jean Monnet WP 10 pp 13-14 <www.jeanmonnetprogram.
org>. However, Sadurski notes that the overall tenor of the EAW decision was ‘We really 
hate what we are doing, but we have no choice’; see Sadurski (n 20) 24.
36  English summary of Judgment in Case P 1/05 (n 16) para 17.
37  See Komárek (n 35) 12.
38  Judgment of 7 November 2005, Ap No 294/2005 (English summary on fi le with the 
author).
39  Judgment of 18 July 2005, 2 BvR 2236/04. For a summary in English, see Press Release 
No 64/2005 of 18 July 2005 on the Court’s website: <www.bverfg.de/bverfg_cgi/pressemit-
teilungen/frames/bvg05-064e> accessed 1 August 2007.
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Komárek has observed that the Polish Tribunal acted in a much more 
pro-European way than did its German counterpart: fi rstly, the latter 
was not forced to decide on an explicit confl ict between Germany’s Basic 
Law and a provision of EU law; and, secondly, whereas the Polish Tribu-
nal had used all its powers to avoid the negative consequences of such 
a confl ict, the German court was not quite so cautious about the conse-
quences of its judgment for the European legal order.40 Cases concerning 
an alleged confl ict between national constitutions and obligations arising 
from the Framework Decision have also been brought before the consti-
tutional courts of  Spain41 and the Czech Republic.42 In addition, the ECJ 
was seized with a question on the validity of the EAW Framework Deci-
sion itself. The Belgian Cour d’Arbitrage made a preliminary reference 
concerning the legal basis of the Framework Decision and the compat-
ibility with fundamental rights of abolishing the dual criminality rule; the 
ECJ upheld the legality of the measure.43
Against this background, the Tribunal went on to emphasise, in the 
previously discussed Accession Treaty decision that followed two weeks 
later,44 that in some cases limits to interpretation may exist. In this deci-
sion, the Tribunal began by reiterating the requirement ‘to respect and be 
sympathetically predisposed towards appropriately shaped regulations of 
international law binding upon the Republic of Poland’, in line with Arti-
cle 9 of the Constitution.45 Moreover, the Tribunal developed a version of 
the pluralist approach to relations between EC and national law, stating 
that, unlike traditional dualism and monism, EC law has created a new 
situation ‘wherein, within each Member State, autonomous legal orders 
co-exist and are simultaneously operative’.46 It also underscored the as-
sumption of mutual loyalty between EC/EU institutions and the Member 
States, which creates ‘a duty for the Member States to show the highest 
standard of respect for Community norms’, but also ‘a duty for the ECJ to 
be sympathetically disposed towards the national legal systems’.47 
40  Komárek (n 35) 5 and 14.
41  Cases Nos RA 3865-2004, RA 3865-2004, RA 4760-2004, RA 3988-2005 and RA 3988-
2005.
42  Case No Pl. ÚS 66/04. English translation available at: <http://test.concourt.cz/angl_
verze/doc/pl-66-04.html> accessed 1 October 2007. The Czech Constitutional Court decid-
ed the case on 3 May 2006, fi nding that Article 14(4) of the Czech Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, which prohibits forcing Czech citizens to leave their homeland, does not preclude 
the temporary surrender of Czech citizens under the EAW, thus interpreting this provision 
in conformity with EU obligations.
43  Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld (ECJ 3 May 2007).
44  Judgment in Case K 18/04 (n 18).
45  English summary of Judgment in Case K 18/04 (n 18) para 10. 
46  Ibid para 12.
47  Ibid para 16.
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However, it then went on to state that, under the explicit wording 
of Article 8(1) of the Polish Constitution, the Constitution remains su-
preme, and that there are limits to interpreting domestic legislation in 
a manner sympathetic to European law.48 In certain circumstances, an 
irreconcilable inconsistency may emerge between a constitutional norm 
and a Community norm, which cannot be removed by means of inter-
pretation.49 Such cases cannot lead to the constitutional norm losing its 
binding force (eg norms protecting fundamental rights), or applying only 
to areas outside the scope of Community law. In the case of such explicit 
confl icts, Parliament must decide on the appropriate manner of resolving 
the inconsistency, with three options at its disposal: amendment of the 
Constitution, renegotiation of the EU measure, or, ultimately, Poland’s 
withdrawal from the Union.50
The EAW decision shows us the importance for other institutional 
actors to take their role in ‘cooperative constitutionalism’ seriously. Since 
there were genuine limits to interpretation, the Tribunal sent a clear mes-
sage to Parliament to amend the Constitution. As Komárek puts it, 
the question will shift from who […] the fi nal arbiter in the EU legal 
order is […] to what the limits of law are. In other words, we will have 
to ask different questions: to what extent the confl ict can be decided 
by the courts (and by their interpretation of law) and what should be 
left to the other constitutional discourse actors, these actors being 
not only politicians, but also the legal/constitutional doctrine and 
the public at large.51
Indeed, as seen above, several other new Member States had amend-
ed their constitutions in order to accommodate the European Arrest War-
rant system. As a matter of fact, in the follow-up to the EAW decision the 
Polish president submitted a bill on revision of Article 55 of the Polish 
Constitution, according to which the extradition ban was to be main-
tained, subject, however, to the exceptions set forth in international trea-
ties. This amendment was adopted on 8 September 2006.
3. Estonia and Latvia: Cases contesting the constitutional amendment 
procedure
Apart from Poland, the adequacy of constitutional amendments has 
also been addressed by the highest courts in Estonia and Latvia, where 
48  Ibid para 14.
49  Ibid para 13.
50  Ibid para 13.
51  Komárek (n 35) 25.
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not only the substance of constitutional provisions but also the very 
means of amending the constitution had been contested.
3.1. Estonia
As in Poland, there had been calls from various quarters in Estonia 
to amend certain provisions of the national constitution prior to acces-
sion, most authoritatively by the Constitutional Expert Commission in 
1998.52 These included Article 1 of the Constitution, which declares the 
eternity and inalienability of Estonia’s sovereignty and independence; 
Article 48, which reserves membership in political parties to Estonian 
citizens; and Article 111, according to which the Bank of Estonia has the 
exclusive right to emit Estonia’s currency. However, due to low public 
support for EU membership in the years preceding the accession referen-
dum, and the extremely arduous constitutional amendment procedure, 
amending the Constitution became a political rather than a legal issue, 
with the question of amending Article 1 increasingly exploited by eu-
rosceptic movements. Against this backdrop, then-Prime Minister Mart 
Laar expressed uncertainty as to whether a constitutional amendment 
was necessary at all,53 and it was unclear until 2001 whether a referen-
dum would be held. Eventually the Constitution was, strictly speaking, 
not amended but rather ‘supplemented’ by a separate Act Supplementing 
the Constitution54 (hereinafter the ‘Supplementing Act’). The Act laconi-
cally authorises Estonia’s membership in the EU (Art 1) and states that 
the Constitution is to be ‘applied, taking into consideration the rights 
and obligations deriving from the Accession Treaty’ (Art 2). The Act was 
approved in a referendum on 14 September 2003, in which two refer-
endums − on accession and on ‘supplementing’ the Constitution - were 
fused into one, following an amendment to the Referendum Act. Accord-
ing to the accompanying media coverage, no harm to Estonia’s sover-
eignty was posed by the Act.55
A number of constitutional complaints were brought to the Consti-
tutional Review Chamber of the Supreme Court, with regard to both the 
means of constitutional revision and substantive confl icts with EC law. 
As regards the former, nine cases in total were brought to the Supreme 
52  Constitutional Expert Commission, ‘Potential Accession to the European Union and its 
Consequences for Estonian Constitutional Law’ (Tallinn, 1998) (in Estonian; on fi le with 
the author).
53  Parliamentary session of 18 January 2001.
54  Act Supplementing the Constitution (2003) 64 RT I (Riigi Teataja - Offi cial Gazette) 
429.
55  Ü Mattheus, ‘The Revisers of the Constitution Are Not Afraid of Harming Estonia’s Sover-
eignty’ Raadio Vaba Euroopa Online (16 May 2002) <www.vabaeuroopa.org> (in Estonian).
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Court following the accession referendum.56 In essence, these claimed 
that (a) the Constitution only allows ‘amendment’ of its text, not its ‘sup-
plementation’ by a separate act; (b) it is impossible to retain ‘eternal and 
inalienable independence’ (Art 1 of the Constitution), while transferring 
part of it to the European Union, and thus the referendum question 
contained two mutually exclusive parts; (c) ratifi cation of the Accession 
Treaty was unconstitutional, as it should have been preceded by amend-
ment of Article 1 of the Constitution (which in turn would require a ref-
erendum); and (d) the new type of referendum was incompatible with the 
Constitution and the Referendum Act. All these claims were rejected by 
the Constitutional Review Chamber on procedural grounds. 
While these cases appear to have been based on legitimate grounds 
deriving from the national constitution, their outcome refl ects the prag-
matic efforts of judges in a very small Member State not to ‘rock the boat’, 
given their new role as European as well as national judges. Although 
the Supplementing Act should inevitably be seen in the context of geopo-
litical and economic imperatives for joining the EU, some broader ques-
tions have been raised about the correctness of such a solution.57 This 
criticism pertains in particular to the potential devaluation of Estonia’s 
clear, directly applicable and up-to-date Constitution; the circumvention 
of rigid amendment procedures; and the failure to demarcate the EU’s 
infl uence on the exercise of constitutional powers and to remove manifest 
confl icts between the Constitution and EU law.
As regards substantive confl icts with EC law, the Constitution-
al Review Chamber was seized in April 2005 with a case regarding the 
electoral rights of EU citizens.58 In this case, the Chancellor of Justice59 
claimed that a provision of the Political Parties Act,60 confi ning eligibility 
for membership in political parties to Estonian citizens only, was uncon-
stitutional pursuant to the aforementioned Article 48 of the Constitution 
and the Supplementing Act, as well as in confl ict with Article 19 of the 
56  Eg Decision No 3-4-1-11-03 of 24 September 2003 Vilu and Estonian Voters Union and 
Decision No 3-4-1-12-03 of 29 September 2003 Kulbok <www.nc.ee> accessed 1 August 
2007.
57  Eg in newspaper articles by A Jõks (Legal Chancellor) and R Maruste (Judge at the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights) and in ‘Joint Public Statement Concerning the Constitutional 
Problems of the Third Constitutional Act’ (2002) 5 Juridica 352-353 (in Estonian).
58  Decision No 3-4-1-1-05 of 19 April 2005 on the Electoral Law <www.nc.ee> accessed 1 
August 2007.
59  The Chancellor of Justice is an institution similar to an ombudsman; he has the right 
to initiate constitutional review proceedings in the Constitutional Review Chamber of the 
Supreme Court. 
60  Political Parties Act (1994) 40 RT I 654 and (2003) 90 RT I 601.
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EC Treaty.61 Namely, the contested provision would not, in effect, ensure 
equal opportunities for an EU citizen standing as a candidate in local 
elections. The petition was dismissed on procedural grounds: there was 
no legal basis for declaring a national law invalid in abstracto on the 
ground of a confl ict with EC law. Despite the applicant’s reference to con-
stitutional norms, the Court held that the provision had, in essence, been 
contested on the ground of its compatibility with EC law. In addition, the 
Court pointed out, with reference to the ECJ’s decision in IN.CO.GE.’90,62 
that a national act which confl icts with EC law could simply be set aside 
in a specifi c dispute. The Supreme Court’s decision was criticised in a 
dissenting opinion, which argued that the Court should have requested 
a preliminary ruling from the ECJ on interpretation of Article 19 EC, so 
as to ascertain whether this article includes the right to membership in 
political parties. The dissenting opinion also expressed regret that Esto-
nia’s highest court had not seized the opportunity to explain the meaning 
and implications of the Supplementing Act and, in so doing, to enhance 
legal certainty.
The Supreme Court’s decision appears to convey a measure of un-
easiness with regard to the meaning and place of the Supplementing Act 
in the Estonian constitutional order. At the time of its adoption, the Act 
had provoked considerable controversy among lawyers.63 It seems as if 
the judges deliberately refused to take a stance on the Act, which was 
widely perceived as a political compromise in order to make EU acces-
sion possible. As in the Polish European Arrest Warrant case, the Con-
stitutional Review Chamber thus sent a message to Estonia’s Parliament, 
suggesting that it might wish to adopt clear legislative provisions on this 
matter. According to the Constitutional Review Chamber: 
The legislator is competent to decide whether it wants to regulate 
the procedure for declaring invalid Estonian legislation which is in 
confl ict with European Union law, just as the legislator is free to 
choose whether it will or will not give the Chancellor of Justice the 
right to review the conformity of national legislation with European 
Union law.
One year later, however, the Constitutional Chamber was nonethe-
less forced to clarify the meaning of the Supplementing Act, following 
Parliament’s express request relating to the aforementioned Article 111 
61  Art 19 EC provides for the right of EU citizens to vote and stand in European Parliament 
and municipal elections when residing in another Member State.
62  Joined Cases C-10/97 to C-22/97 Ministero delle Finanze v IN.CO.GE.’90 Srl [1998] ECR 
I-6307.
63  For details see Albi, EU Enlargement (n 3) 91.
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of the Constitution, according to which the Bank of Estonia has the ex-
clusive right to issue Estonian currency. The European Commission had 
earlier called on the Estonian Government to amend the Article; however, 
the Government insisted that Article 111 did not constitute an obstacle 
to adopting the common currency, when read together with the Supple-
menting Act. The Constitutional Chamber upheld this view in its opinion 
of 11 May 2006,64 stating that the Draft Act Amending the Bank of Es-
tonia Act, which made preparatory arrangements for eventual adoption 
of the euro, was compatible with the Constitution. In addition, the Court 
also directly addressed the position of the Supplementing Act in the con-
text of the supremacy of EC law, stating that the text of the Constitu-
tion should be read together with the Supplementing Act, and that those 
parts of the Constitution incompatible with EC law should not be applied. 
By virtue of this statement, the Court appears, in fact, to have granted 
unconditional supremacy to EC law. 
It should be noted that, following the numerous controversies sur-
rounding the role of the Supplementing Act in Estonia’s constitutional 
order, an increasing number of prominent lawyers and politicians have 
called for a wider EU-related amendment package, to be introduced di-
rectly into the text of the Constitution, or even for the adoption of a new 
constitution. 
3.2. Latvia
The Latvian Constitutional Court has likewise had to address cases 
pertaining to the correctness of the means by which Latvia’s Constitu-
tion was amended in view of EU accession, and has taken an equally 
pragmatic approach. As in Estonia (and also Lithuania), in Latvia the 
Constitution requires a referendum to amend its Articles 1 and 2 on sov-
ereignty and independence. However, due to concerns similar to those in 
Estonia, the amendment was carried out by way of parliamentary proce-
dure in May 2003. The amended Article 68 allows Latvia to delegate part 
of its competences to ‘international institutions’. In addition, a new type 
of referendum was introduced for EU accession: whereas a constitutional 
amendment referendum requires, under Article 79, a minimum turnout 
of 50 percent, the new EU referendum merely required the participa-
tion of at least half the number of voters who participated in the previ-
ous parliamentary elections, of whom a majority had to vote in favour. A 
referendum was also envisaged for ‘substantial changes’ in the terms of 
membership; this expression was meant to include potential secession 
from the EU. Such a move rested on the argument that no harm to the 
64  Opinion No 3-4-1-3-06 on the interpretation of Article 111 <www.nc.ee> accessed 1 
August 2007.
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principles of sovereignty and independence, established in Articles 1 and 
2 of the Constitution, would ensue from EU accession.65 However, schol-
ars argued that a wider constitutional revision was necessary,66 particu-
larly as regards enabling the extradition of Latvian citizens and granting 
EU citizens the right to vote in municipal elections. Amendment of these 
issues did indeed follow after Latvia’s accession. 
This method of constitutional amendment prompted the submission 
of fi ve petitions to the Constitutional Court in November 2003,67 claiming 
that Parliament was not authorised to adopt these amendments without 
prior amendment of Articles 1 and 2 of the Constitution. The petitions 
contested the constitutionality of both the amendments and the acces-
sion referendum, as well as of the Accession Treaty. The Constitutional 
Court declared the petitions inadmissible on the ground that the appli-
cants had failed to substantiate a violation of their fundamental rights 
under the Constitution. It also noted that the choice of constitutional 
amendment procedure rested with Parliament, the Court having no com-
petence to assess the conformity of one norm of the Constitution with 
another or with the Constitution as a whole. When a norm has been 
incorporated into the Constitution, it forms an integral part thereof and 
enjoys the corresponding legal force.68
4. Towards ‘constitutional amorphousness’?
Discourse on the reception of the supremacy of EC law in national 
law has predominantly focused on ‘judicial dialogues’69 and ‘coopera-
tive constitutionalism’,70 with national courts and the ECJ engaging in 
structured dialogue and cooperation to resolve issues pertaining to the 
65  Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Latvia, The Theoretical Foundation of Amendments 
to Satversme Proposed by the Working Group (Riga, 2001) 6ff.
66  Reported in A Usaĉka, ‘The Impact of the European Integration Process on the Constitu-
tion of Latvia’ in Kellermann et al (n 1) 343-344.
67  The registration numbers for these cases are 119-123/2003. The decisions of inadmissi-
bility are not available in English. They are summarised in A Endzins, ‘Constitutional Court 
of the Republic of Latvia’ in The Position of Constitutional Courts Following Integration into 
the European Union, proceedings of the conference held in Bled, Slovenia (30 September - 2 
October 2004) 214-215.
68  See summary of the decisions in Endzins (n 67) 214-215.
69  See A Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutional Dialogues in the European Community’ in AM 
Slaughter, A Stone Sweet and JHH Weiler (eds), The European Court and National Courts 
− Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change in Its Social Context (Hart Publishing, Oxford 
1998) 325-326.
70  See A Sajó, ‘Learning Co-operative Constitutionalism the Hard Way: The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court Shying Away from EU Supremacy’ (2004) Zeitschrift für Staats- und 
Europawissenschaften 351.
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relationship between Community and national legal orders.71 The cases 
considered in this paper demonstrate that, in certain situations, genuine 
limits to EU-friendly interpretation may well exist, and that in such cases 
courts in CEE Member States have instead engaged in dialogue with na-
tional parliaments regarding the need to remove manifest confl icts with 
EU law from national constitutions.72 Indeed, in a number of cases in 
both old and new Member States where a confl ict between EC law and na-
tional constitutional law has narrowly been averted, constitutional courts 
appear to have been saddled with an unduly high burden in seeking a 
pragmatic solution. With the courts’ hands thus tied by the constraints of 
EU membership, the role of political institutions, especially parliaments, 
assumes particular importance with regard to exercising self-control and 
extra prudence when drafting constitutional amendments. Furthermore, 
action at the political rather than the judicial level is also mandated by 
concerns about legal certainty and clarity for citizens, as well as broader 
concerns about legitimacy.
Such a change in focus is also warranted if the constitutional culture 
which prevailed prior to EU accession is to be sustained. The judgments 
considered in this paper, while taking a favourable approach towards 
participation in the European Union, seem to reinforce concerns that 
had been voiced earlier regarding a certain degree of devaluation of the 
constitutions in Central and Eastern European countries in the process 
of European integration.73 Constitutions in general have been classifi ed 
according to two main types, ‘historic’ and ‘revolutionary’.74 The former, 
which include the British and Dutch constitutions, for example, have de-
veloped incrementally over a long-term period; they are non-formalistic, 
and at least as much political as legal by nature. In contrast, ‘revolution-
ary’ constitutions, including those of Germany, Italy, France and Ireland, 
tend to have originated in a political or social cataclysm that forms the 
‘moving myth’ which inspires them; these constitutions represent a polit-
ical reality, and tend to have a distinctly legal character enforced by con-
stitutional courts.75 The constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe be-
long to the second group. As a reaction to the Communist period, marked 
by a nihilistic attitude to constitutional rules, they have a distinctly legal 
71  For a more detailed account, see M Claes, The National Courts’ Mandate in the European 
Constitution (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2006).
72  For further cases, including the Hungarian Constitutional Court’s sugar stocks case of 
2004, see Albi, ‘Supremacy of EC Law’ (preliminary footnote to this paper).
73  See Albi, EU Enlargement (n 3) 114ff.
74  See L Besselink, ‘The Dutch Constitution, the European Constitution and the Referen-
dum in the Netherlands’ in A Albi and J Ziller (eds), The European Constitution and National 
Constitutions: Ratifi cation and Beyond (Kluwer, The Hague 2006) 113ff.
75  Ibid.
57CYELP 3 [2007] 39-58
character, are relatively lengthy and detailed, and their observance is 
rigorously policed by powerful constitutional courts, with a high ratio of 
annulment of legislative acts.76 In the process of accession, EU amend-
ments to a number of these constitutions remained substantially and/or 
procedurally minimal, whereas equivalent changes in domestic aspects 
of governance would normally have led to corresponding constitutional 
amendments. This prompts the question of whether constitutions con-
tinue to be ‘taken seriously’ in CEE.77
Concerns about a ‘European defi cit’ have also been raised with re-
gard to the constitutions of ‘old’ Member States, a number of which, as 
seen above, contain no or only minimal references to the EU, and might 
thus gradually become somewhat obsolete in terms of the real exercise 
of powers.78 As Claes notes, ‘[t]he way in which European integration is 
dealt with in the constitutional texts [of the old Member States] is often 
disappointing, often inconsistent, at times downright clumsy […] and in 
many cases underdeveloped’.79 In Denmark, where in 2007 the Constitu-
tion still contains no explicit mention of the EU, and courts rarely exer-
cise constitutional review, Hjalte Rasmussen has noted a trend towards 
‘waning constitutionalism’ and ‘constitutional amorphousness’.80 Such 
constitutions have rightly prompted the following comment by Claes:81
The least that can be said is that these States may not be taking 
their own Constitution seriously, and that they may not do justice to 
the functions of a constitutional document, which is, among others, 
to constitute the polity. To omit the EU and the State’s participation 
in it from the national Constitution can even be considered a devalu-
ation of the national Constitution, and [an] expression of careless-
ness as regards the supposed most fundamental norm of the polity.
Against this background, a country such as Croatia, which is con-
sidering various routes for constitutional amendment in view of EU ac-
cession, would be well advised to exercise its discretion in favour of those 
models in which constitutions contain a wider set of provisions address-
ing the EU specifi cally, rather than membership in international organi-
76  This argument has been developed in more detail in Albi, EU Enlargement (n 3) 22ff. See 
also E Smith, ‘The Constitution as an Instrument of Change: Introduction’ in E Smith (ed), 
The Constitution as an Instrument of Change (SNS Förlag, Stockholm 2003) 15ff.
77  Albi, EU Enlargement (n 3) 114ff. 
78  B De Witte, ‘Constitutional Aspects of European Union Membership in the Original Six 
Member States: Model Solutions for the Applicant Countries?’ in Kellermann et al (n 1) 73.
79  Claes (n 1) 124.
80  H Rasmussen, ‘Denmark’s Waning Constitutionalism and Article 20 of the Constitution 
on Transfer of Sovereignty’ in Albi and Ziller (n 74) 149-156.
81  Claes (n 1) 124.
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sations in general. The constitutions of Germany, France, Portugal and, 
among the new Member States, Slovakia and Romania are particularly 
well suited to offer such examples. It is worth bearing in mind that ‘there 
is life after accession’,82 and that, more fundamentally, the broader na-
ture and credibility of a constitution may well be at stake when choosing 
the course of action.
82  Comment by M Claes at the Zagreb University conference mentioned in the preliminary 
footnote to this paper.
